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 We present data from a series of focus groups held with lay-citizens in London in 2012.
 We found that lay-critiques of CCS were similar to those negative views put forward by environmental groups.
 Lay views on CCS were strongly framed by conceptions of nuclear power.
 This framing may present a challenge to policy-makers and industry committed to implementing CCS.
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a b s t r a c t
Around the world there is increasing interest from government and industry in the potential for Carbon
Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies to play a part in decarbonisation. This paper examines how
people with little previous exposure to CCS technology, frame and discuss it, and how in the absence of
information, ideas, notions, values and experiences shape opinion. We present data from a series of focus
groups held with environmental activists, planning councillors, and adult and youth community group
members in London in 2012. We found that views on CCS are shaped strongly by wider factors,
particularly trade offs between different energy futures. Lay-critiques were similar to those put forward
by environmental groups and were strongly framed by conceptions of nuclear power. We argue that
although there is little public disquiet concerning this technology in private opinions were generally
negative. This, and the use of nuclear power as a framing device, may present a challenge to policy-
makers and industry committed to implementing CCS while promoting education as the main
mechanism for public acceptance.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In March 2012, the UK Government launched the Carbon
Capture Roadmap. This policy, subtitled ‘Supporting Deployment
of Carbon Capture and Storage in the UK’, leaves no doubt of the
government's support for this new technology.
"Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) has the potential to be one
of the most cost effective technologies for decarbonisation of
the UK's power and industrial sectors, as well as those of
economies worldwide. The Government is committed to help-
ing make CCS a viable option for reducing emissions in the UK
and in doing so to accelerate the potential for CCS to be
deployed in other countries. Our vision is for widespread
deployment of cost-competitive CCS "(DECC, 2012).
The UK Overarching National Policy Statement for Energy of July
20111 also made it clear that ‘all commercial scale fossil fuelled
generating stations have to be carbon capture ready’ (DECC, 2011).
CCS technology involves capturing CO2 emissions at the indus-
trial combustion source, compressing it for transportation and
transporting it (usually via pipelines) to an appropriate geological
site into which it is injected for long-term storage (Gibbins and
Chalmers, 2008). CCS is however controversial and there has been
a protracted debate in the UK as to its desirability and effective-
ness (see for example Scrase and Watson, 2009; Markusson and
Shackley, 2012). Critics, such as Greenpeace, argue that it has yet to
be deployed and thus shown to work on a large-scale (Greenpeace
International, 2008). Others argue that it presents a moral hazard
either due to risks associated with the technology or because it
enables continued reliance on fossil fuels at a point where
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investment should be shifting to fully renewable technologies (see
for example Tsouris et al., 2010; Stephens and Verma, 2006). As we
have seen with other technologies, such as nuclear power and GM
foods, the perceptions of the public have a signiﬁcant role to play
in the way in which these technologies are able to be deployed.
Perceptions of both the technologies themselves and the way in
which they are governed, managed and controlled are important
and CCS will be no different (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). Equally,
there are examples of local publics in other contexts being
engaged in, and supportive of, CCS deployment (Markusson
et al., 2011). It is difﬁcult to promote technological change without
some degree of public engagement and though we have seen this
acknowledged with increasing political and legal commitments to
public participation in decision making around these issues since
the 1990s these initiatives reﬂect a range of approaches and
motivations for involvement of the public (Stirling, 2005;
Wynne, 2006). A lack of genuine engagement with public percep-
tions of CCS, while not necessarily leading to project failure, as was
the case with the Barendrecht project in the Netherlands (Feenstra
et al., 2010; Vergragt, 2009), may affect the legitimacy of the policy
approach with consequent kickback impacts on governmental
trust, as was arguably the case with genetically modiﬁed organ-
isms in the UK (e.g., Wynne, 2006).
In an earlier article we explored some of the legal obligations that
will provide opportunities for public participation around planning for
CCS projects (Lee et al., 2013). We identiﬁed, however, tension
between the perceived urgency of action on climate change, and a
commitment to public participation in the development of infrastruc-
ture that forms part of that action. And in fact, whatever the legal
obligations to allow for participation, a close examination of the policy
background to CCS indicates that the actual space for the public to
inﬂuence particular projects is very limited: enforceable legal obliga-
tions to allow for public participation around CCS are combined with
limited practical opportunities to inﬂuence decisions. For example,
with respect to ‘moral hazard’, UK national planning policy concludes
that ‘CO2 emissions are not reasons to prohibit the consenting of
projects which use these technologies’; more generally, ‘the impor-
tance placed by the government on demonstrating CCS, and the
potential deployment of this technology beyond the demonstration
stage’, should be taken into account in considering applications for
consent of CCS projects (DECC, 2011). In this very complicated and
potentially problematic context, it is interesting to begin to explore
both how public views on CCS are formed, and how people view their
role in the development of this particular new technology. Given this
context, the aim of this paper is to explore lay-perceptions of CCS
technologies. The study uses data from four focus groups conducted
with different publics in London in 2012. The purpose of the study is
to explore the multiple dimensions underlying social discussions of
CCS projects, which may inﬂuence the deployment of the technology.
It also aims to inform policy decisions on public participationwith CCS
technology in the future.
The paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 presents ﬁndings
from previous research on both public attitudes to, and acceptance
of, CCS. Section 3 provides details of our methodology—participant
selection and sampling. Section 4 presents key themes that
emerged from the focus group data. The ﬁnal section discusses
what these ﬁndings might mean in the context of further policy
implementation in this area.
2. Background: attitudes to CCS
Over the past 5 years, as CCS has emerged as a signiﬁcant
technology, there has been considerable research that has looked
at the attitudes of various stakeholder groups to CCS. Different
approaches have been used to study public perceptions, with the
majority being quantitative research such as surveys and question-
naires (e.g., Reiner et al., 2006; Johnsson et al., 2010; Pietzner et al.,
2011; Terwel et al., 2012), and a smaller number of qualitative focus
groups, interviews and workshops (e.g., Ashworth et al., 2009;
Bradbury et al., 2009; Ha-Duong et al., 2009; Mabon et al., 2013).
Most researchers agree that awareness of CCS amongst non-
specialist groups is limited (e.g., Oltra et al., 2010; Van Alphen
et al., 2007; Malone et al., 2010; Reiner et al., 2006; De Best-
Waldhober et al., 2009). Given that CCS is a relatively new
technology and distant to people's lives, this may not be surprising,
nor relevant within a democratic context, as we go on to argue.
Nevertheless, even with a brief introduction to the technology,
negative reactions, particularly around risk, tend to dominate dis-
cussions. Potential leakages, impacts on ecoystems and human
health, are common concerns raised (Palmgren et al., 2004;
Shackley et al., 2005). In directly affected neighbourhoods, the
perceptions are even more negative, with risks perceived to be
higher than beneﬁts (Huijts et al., 2007). Nor are concerns limited to
risk, but extend to what we have referred to above as ‘moral hazard’,
and to questions about who is promoting the technology and why.
Higher levels of acceptance amongst the public have been shown
when CCS is perceived as a bridging technology that will not reduce
investments in renewable technologies, when the government is not
perceived as having a special interest in a particular outcome and
when the public believe they will be involved in a wider debate on
climate change and CCS (Ashworth et al., 2009).
Such views differ signiﬁcantly from the more optimistic views
of decision-makers and experts who, as the initial quote at the
beginning of this paper illustrates, tend to be more enthusiastic
advocates of the technology (Huijts et al., 2007; Hansson and
Bryngelsson, 2009). This difference in views is problematized in
much of the literature, which argues that raising public awareness
and improving public acceptance of CCS is crucial for the large
scale implementation of CCS (Oltra et al., 2010; Bäckstrand et al.,
2011).
The perceived need for increased public awareness is also
creating conﬂict around the best means of accessing public
opinion. Malone et al. (2010) go as far as to argue that ‘the almost
total lack of knowledge about CCS is a formidable barrier to
conducting a valid survey of opinions’. Since the people being
surveyed know little about CCS, they argue that the most surveys
can do is collect ‘pseudo opinions’ or ‘non attitudes’ and therefore
cannot be relied upon as an effective barometer of how the public
would make decisions in speciﬁc contexts. Similarly, De Best-
Waldhober et al. (2009) argue that views expressed in surveys on
CCS are unstable and easily changed and therefore not a good
indicator of how people will form views in a more speciﬁc context.
Public attitudes to new technologies have been the subject of
research for two or more decades in Science and Technology
Studies (STS) (e.g., Durant et al., 1998; Martin et al., 1992;
Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2006; Scheufele and Lewenstein, 2005).
These studies have produced considerable evidence to support the
argument that a deﬁcit model approach to CCS, which focuses on
the need to improve the public's understanding, is problematic for
two reasons.
Firstly, we know that the relationship between knowledge and
attitudes is far from a straightforward and direct one—knowing
more about a particular technology does not necessarily mean that
someone will be more supportive or enthusiastic about it (Evans
and Durant, 1995). This is supported by more recent research into
CCS in particular. For instance, Upham and Roberts' (2011) pan-
European focus group study, which explored citizens' attitudes to
CCS as they were exposed to information about the technology,
found that although this information shifted attitudes, they moved
in a number of different ways. It was not necessarily the case that
information produced more positive attitudes towards the
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technology. In several countries, participants became more negative
towards CCS after exposure to information. Likewise, a survey
conducted by Pietzner et al. (2011) in Germany, Greece, Norway,
the Netherlands, Romania and the United Kingdom showed that
while these publics were slightly supportive of CCS, and general
awareness was low, a higher level of awareness of CCS did not
automatically result in higher levels of acceptance. In fact, the level
of knowledge about CCS seems to have a minor inﬂuence on social
acceptance (Kraeusel and Möst, 2012).
Secondly, as Riesch et al. (2013) point out, the conditions under
which better-informed and more considered opinions might be
formed rarely exist in reality. Given that most people will not have
any personal interaction with the technology, but will be allowed
to express opinions of support or otherwise within the democratic
setting, how should we expect people to think about this new
technology? Riesch et al. (2013) argue that a more realistic set of
conditions might be those that ‘enabled discussion with family or
friends, inﬂuence by opinion formers through various media and
arrival at more or less stable conclusions' (p. 694). Furthermore,
amongst political science scholars, the matter of civil learning is an
ongoing issue and there is no agreement about the knowledge
requirements of democratic citizenship (Graber, 2005).
Instead of using deﬁcit model approaches to understanding
public attitudes to CCS, there is considerable STS research that
suggests the need for a greater focus on understanding how
publics shape their views. Crucially, the extent to which existing
cultural frames of reference—interests, values, previous experience
and ways of responding to and interpreting the world—shape
people's evaluation of CCS. For example, a study of public attitudes
to nanotechnology, another technology with a very low level of
public knowledge and awareness, by Scheufele and Lewenstein
(2005) drew on Popkin's work which examines decision making in
the absence of information. They found that people collect only as
much or as little information as they ﬁnd necessary to make a
decision. In the absence of any speciﬁc need to become knowl-
edgeable about a topic, people rely upon heuristics or cognitive
shortcuts to form views. This concept is also echoed in work from
Social Psychology, looking at preference construction, which has
found that while views or preferences are sensitive to context,
they are based upon stable, revealed or inherent preferences
(Kivetz et al., 2008). Furthermore, as the motivation to make a
correct decision, or the opportunity to use knowledge decreases,
the likelihood that these underlying attitudes will guide a choice
increases (Sanbonmatsu and Fazio, 1990). We have already argued
elsewhere (Lee et al., 2013) that there appears to be little scope for
the public to shape policies around CCS in the UK. In light of this,
and the research described above, it seems reasonable to expect
that people are likely to draw strongly upon their values, predis-
positions and previous experiences in forming views around CCS.
This paper sets out to understand this further, exploring in more
detail lay responses to CCS, how it is evaluated and what is drawn
upon in forming views.
As such, focus groups, though not able to provide data that is
nationally representative in terms of statistical signiﬁcance, pro-
vide a good opportunity to explore responses to CCS and to
examine how it is evaluated and what people draw on to construct
a response. It is with this last point in mind that we set out to
explore attitudes towards CCS in the UK further.
3. Methodology
3.1. Procedure
The results presented here are based on four qualitative focus
group discussions involving 24 interviewees, conducted in London
in 2012. A focus group is a group interview in which a small
number of participants (typically fewer than 20) discuss a given
issue, under the guidance of a moderator who preferably assumes
a retracted position (see for example Barbour and Kitzinger, 1998).
Focus groups are not designed to provide data that is nationally
representative. They can be useful in exploring public attitudes as
they are designed to be free form in nature, to allow for participant
led discussion, and particularly to allow unanticipated associations
and meanings to arise spontaneously, what Petts et al. (2001) call
‘shared interpretative practices’. Social attitudes can often be the
result of social interactions, rather than an opinion formed in
isolation and as such focus groups allow for the exploration of
opinions in a social setting. Focus groups can provide access to the
formation of social attitudes, framings and understandings, impor-
tantly allowing for topics to spontaneously arise which may not
have arisen in a formal interview. Focus groups are susceptible to a
variety of inﬂuences, particularly the interventions of the facil-
itator and vocal participants (Stewart et al., 2007). While this can
present a problem, it can also be seen as mimicking aspects of
natural or everyday conversations. In this study participants were
told that they had been invited to discuss energy, but no further
information was given in advance. In this way we minimised the
impact of any pre-framed associations on the part of the research-
ers on the shape of the discussion and allowed for those issues
most important to the participants to come to the fore.
The research also set out to look at the ‘real world’ views, as
outlined above, that might be based on little information but
nevertheless, within a democracy, have equal currency to those
more informed opinions. Speciﬁcally, we wanted to see how
people form views on CCS when confronted with limited informa-
tion. We therefore did not provide any background brieﬁng on CCS
in advance and provided only a very basic description during the
focus groups.2
3.2. Sampling
In setting up each focus group we sought to explore different
perspectives, interests and levels of lay-expertise relating to
energy and renewable technologies and their policy context, and
to identify any potential differences. To do so, we recruited
participants such that each focus group brought together people
who were members of particular community groups or had similar
civic roles. The different groups are detailed in Table 1.
The focus groups were all held in London and recruited from
London communities. As there have been no major energy infra-
structure applications within these communities, this increased
the likelihood that none of the participants had direct personal
experience of local energy infrastructure. The aim was to allow for
a wider discussion of rights and responsibilities of citizens on local
versus national priorities for low-carbon energy. We were inter-
ested in exploring different sorts of lay response to CCS given that
when energy projects are developed, the ‘public’ will be granted
formal opportunities to contribute to decision making (Lee et al.,
2013). The ‘public’ is also not a homogeneous mass of people.
Participants for the ﬁrst two focus groups were recruited from
members (rather than paid staff) of local environmental groups,
and elected councilors who were members of local planning
committees. These participants were identiﬁed as members of a
particular group/organisation (environmental groups or elected
councilors on planning committees) using public websites. They
were contacted directly by a research assistant and invited to
2 The basic description of CCS provided to participants was CCS technology
involves capturing CO2 emissions at the industrial combustion source, compressing
it for transportation and transporting it (usually via pipelines) to an appropriate
geological site into which it is injected for long-term storage.
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participate. Participants for the other two focus groups, which
were both held in a London community centre, were recruited by
the centre on our behalf from amongst their regular user groups—
one group from their adult users and another from their youth
club. The centre was instructed to recruit participants without any
particular expertise or interest in energy or the environment (i.e.,
they were not members of environmental groups or had no
professional interests or stake in this area). All participants
volunteered and gave their informed consent to take part in the
study. All participants received a monetary incentive for their
participation.
Each focus group met once and the discussions lasted
60–120 min. The focus groups were moderated by a member of
the research team, with a second member being present to take
notes. A semi-structured interview guide was used in all groups,
whereby the facilitator used a pre-decided list of questions or
prompts to put to the group, but was also encouraged to use the
questions as a starting point through which to encourage a wider,
free-ﬂowing discussion. The interview guide encompassed themes
such as approaches to energy policy in the UK, wind power, CCS,
and views on participation around such technologies.
The focus groups were audio recorded, transcribed verbatim
and analysed by two researchers using both transcripts and
repeated listening to the recordings. Data was analysed using a
thematic analysis approach which involves a careful reading of the
data, coding generation and the identiﬁcation of themes for
further analysis. The themes, codes and sub-codes were agreed
between both researchers (Boyatzis, 1998).
All interviews were conducted in English. All personal informa-
tion has been removed from quotations to ensure participant
conﬁdentiality.
4. Results
4.1. Lay-citizens views on CCS
In keeping with previous research, we found a low level of
awareness and knowledge of CCS technologies by all participants.
While a number of the participants in the environmental and
councillor focus groups had heard of CCS, none expressed any
detailed knowledge of CCS:
“Yeah. I've heard about it but I don't begin to understand the
science behind it and I don't know if lay people can.” (Group 2)
“I'm really curious about this technology. When I started to
work with my organisations I was starting to be involved in a
discussion with a lot of researchers who are working in that
ﬁeld and I'm still reading” (Group 1)
“I don't know enough about it…” (Group 1)
No one in the youth or community groups had heard of the
technology before. Nevertheless, despite these differences, the
views expressed and discussions taking place in the different
focus groups bore striking resemblances to each other. On the
whole, the views were negative towards CCS:
“At the moment we don't want it, I think.” (Group 2)
“In theory it sounds a ﬁne idea, in practice it's probably not the
solution to the problem it's held up to be in the ﬁrst place”
(Group 2)
“No, it's not a great solution. Because you are still polluting
something else” (Group 4)
One participant seemed to accept the use of CCS, but only as a
‘bridging technology’:
“But it's one of these things I think that's not a permanent
solution, but it's a nice stop gap solution.” (Group 1)
Another disliked it exactly because it was promising a ‘techno-
ﬁx’:
“I associate it with this myth that a technology is going to come
along and solve all our problems. Like, those people who say,
“Oh, we'll think of something”. So, we know the problems that
we have, we're not going to deal with them, we'll continue
along this path because a miracle will happen. I see it as one of
those things, so I'm not really supportive of the whole idea.”
(Group 1)
Interestingly, the ‘uninformed’ views identiﬁed in our focus
groups were not different to those elicited by other researchers
who also provided information brieﬁngs to their research subjects.
(see Ashworth et al., 2010 for a general list; Oltra et al., 2010).
These views were also more similar to the views that previous
research has attributed to environmental groups (Corry and
Riesch, 2012; Huijts et al., 2007) than views attributed to industry
experts (Hansson and Bryngelsson, 2009; Van Alphen et al., 2007).
This raises important issues for policymakers wanting to build
support for the technology—as we discuss later.
4.2. Identiﬁcation of risks and uncertainties
A brief explanation of the technology2 spontaneously gener-
ated discussion about potential risks and concerns around CCS
deployment. Participants across all of the groups quickly raised
and articulated many of the concerns, key risk issues and uncer-
tainties that have been articulated by NGO groups and experts.
Speciﬁcally concerns about siting and safety and the potential
effects of CO2 on wildlife and environment were common
(Greenpeace International, 2008; Hansson and Bryngelsson, 2009).
Our focus group expressed concerns and doubts about siting
and safety:
“It sounds dangerous…how long can you store it?” (Group 3)
“How safe would it be?” (Group 3)
“Where is the carbon to be stored?” (Group 1)
“Do we think it would be safe?” (Group 3)
Participants were also concerned about the potential effects of
the CO2 and the storage facilities affecting the environment and
marine wildlife:
Table 1
Focus groups.
Group no. Participants Participants (no. and gender) Age range (years) Interview date
FG1 Environmental activists 8 (6 males, 2 females) 18–65þ 8th May 2012
FG2 Local councilors and members of planning committees 5 (3 males, 2 females) 36–65 10th May 2012
FG3 Local community group members 11 (1 male, 10 females) 18–65þ 25th June 2012
FG4 Local youth group members 10 (9 males, 1 female) 16–18 3rd December 2012
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“What about the ﬁsh?” (Group 3)
“But how long do you have to store it before it affects some-
thing?” (Group 4)
“I mean won't there be side effects and environment problems.
We're already facing these global warming things, but wouldn't
that… if you put the gas underneath…” (Group 3)
In line with previous research on CCS (Upham and Roberts,
2011; Butler et al., 2013), there was considerable concern in our
focus groups over identifying risks and the prevalence of uncer-
tainty, with participants mentioning unintended consequences,
such as creating earthquakes or dangerous changes to the seabed.
Members of the focus groups also recognised the technological
complexity of CCS and further identiﬁed the likelihood of long
chains of consequences, many of them unintended; this paralleled
the possible consequences of nuclear power which extended even
to weapons production. This meant that, in addition to concerns
about the intrinsic nature of CCS, there were concerns about
implementation ‘in practice’, the un-tested nature of the technology
and where this might lead. A major point of discussion in the focus
groups related to future concerns and uncertainties around CCS:
“What are the risks of having this type of, doing this project? How
is the earth going to be affected? How are we going to be
affected…or what are the actual beneﬁts, is it going to be
beneﬁcial?” (Group 3)
“As far as I recall, the engineering process has proved a lot more
difﬁcult than anticipated” (Group 2)
“If it doesn't work, would we just disconnect the ﬁtting and just
park the CO2 in the atmosphere? It's an easy way of escaping a
ﬁnal solution” (Group 1)
“Basically we don't have any idea what the negative unin-
tended consequences of that will be. It does sound like when
you're using such a potentially volatile… who knows what's
happen on the seabed and we have some idea that things do
shift unexpectedly particularly as the globe is shifting and as
global warming is affecting things.” (Group 2)
“It just sounds like another problem is going to come up in the
future” (Group 3)
“There may well be problems which develop, like in terms of
seismic instabilities and stuff, and until it's rolled out on a large
scale you won't really know whether that will be a problem or
not. There might be unforeseen things” (Group 1)
There was a prolonged discussion in Group 3 about CCS being
something that simply stored trouble for later, which was imbued
with an overarching scepticism around the possibility of long-term
storage of anything, as the extract of this conversation below
exempliﬁes:
“F1—Whatever goes down there will come up again anyway
F2—It will come up eventually one day
F1—How are you going to hide it?” (Group 3)
4.3. CCS in the context of other energy technologies
Though many of the participants raised speciﬁc concerns about
CCS as a technology in and of itself (as outlined in Sections 4.1 and
4.2 above), when discussing it as an option for reducing CO2, it was
rarely discussed in isolation from the wider context of energy
demand and generation or other options:
“I think it would be much easier technically to reduce demand
than it would be to go down that route.” (Group 2)
“If you believe that the problem here is climate change and too
much carbon in the atmosphere, then I guess that would be a
feasible solution maybe, but if you believe, like I do, that the
problem is more than that, it's the whole cycle, how we
develop, how we deﬁne growth or use our limited resources,
possible over population then that is a small drop in the bucket
of the ﬁxes that we need”. (Group 1)
CCS was also discussed very much in terms of its impact on
other energy technologies. In particular, participants constructed a
tradeoff between CCS and renewables, pointing out that CCS
would be problematic if its development was at the expense of
investment in renewables:
“…we need to compare will this be better than having wind
turbines around?” (Group 3)
Several participants touched on what experts call the ‘moral
hazard’ of CCS deployment. Concerns here were focused on the
technology allowing continued use of oil and gas, and potentially
delaying action on other low carbon energy options:
“…if it helps to reduce the environmental impact system, it's
deﬁnitely worth pursuing, but not at the expense of developing
renewable and energy efﬁciency” (Group 1)
“I'm sceptical because that's the way of going on with your
approach of use of electricity or energy or whatever and trying
to postpone the change” (Group 1)
“Isn't it just an excuse to keep using coal and oil that is running
out anyway?” (Group 3).
“I think it supports continuing with big building, used to justify
building new big coal power plants or gas turbines or whatever
then it's carrying on. We can carry on business as usual and
“look we're dealing with climate change because we're working
with carbon capture and storage.” (Group 1)
4.4. Nuclear power as a framing device
Participants in all but the youth group (Group 4) drew parallels
to nuclear power seemingly using nuclear as a dominant frame
through which to judge this new technology. The comparison was
not a favourable one, with all views on nuclear power being
negative ones. These comparisons were made very early on in the
discussion and spontaneously, without reference to any external
prompts. This framing appeared to shape their views in a number
of ways, drawing on more obvious comparisons between CCS and
nuclear such as the long-term storage difﬁculties of both technol-
ogies, to more abstract ones comparing the hype surrounding both
as well as each being perceived as a technological and ‘unnatural’
ﬁx to problems of energy and climate:
“F1—That sounds potentially a little bit risky to me.
M1—In the way that nuclear energy sounded wonderful 40
years ago.
F1—Yeah, we'll just put it under the sea”. (Group 2).
“That reminds me a lot of the way we discuss all the time about
nuclear power. It's not just a building or plant station but there
are a lot of extra costs that you have to consider.” (Group 1)
“Didn't they try [storing waste in rocks] with nuclear? it would
be much worse with carbon dioxide because it would kill the
ﬁsh” (Group 3)
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“I think in a way it again parallels with nuclear because if the
Government of whoever says ‘oh we can build a new coal or gas
power station because we will have CCS and deal with the CO2.’
And it's like with nuclear they say we can build a nuclear power
station because we will have worked out what to do with the
waste.” (Group 1)
Where previous studies have noted that nuclear power can
come up in general conversation about CCS, it is usually as one
among many comparisons made (Upham and Roberts, 2011). One
previous study (Riesch et al., 2013) found online participants
drawing heavily on the earthquake and subsequent tsunami in
Japan leading to the Fukushima nuclear power plant crisis—to
critique and question the relative safety of CCS as a similarly
conceived large-scale energy infrastructure. Here they argued that
the immediacy of real-world events beyond the information
provided in a focus group setting had affected how people frame
and discuss CCS. As Riesch et al. argue, the events ‘provided a
‘ready-frame’ with which participants could articulate fears about
unknown or predictable risks: the respondents' social representa-
tion of the unfamiliar technology of CCS was conceptually anchored
to the more well known energy technology (Riesch et al., 2013).
Our results suggest that the framing of nuclear power may go
beyond simply using a ‘ready frame’ to something much deeper
and less temporally speciﬁc—for instance, our focus groups were
held 18 months after the Fukushima crisis, and nothing speciﬁc
about these events was mentioned in our groups. Indeed any
reference to real world events tended to be much more historic—
referring to incidents that happened during the testing of nuclear
power during the 1960s, or nuclear accidents of the 1970s
and 1980s:
“If you remember they did that with the enriched uranium …
from the nuclear power plant and they buried them … in the
60s and the early 70s, not only in this country but most of the
Western countries have done that …” (Group 3)
The dominant negative framing of CCS by a stigmatized
technology such as nuclear power contrasts with a positive
framing of some other options. Here wind and solar power,
alongside demand management were framed as positive path-
ways. They were described repeatedly as ‘sensible’ thus making an
appeal to everyday understanding that may not easily be chal-
lenged by the provision of more information. Wind and solar
power were also seen as ‘cheaper’ and demand management as
‘easier’, a contrast with the perceived costs and technological
complexity of CCS. Indeed we sensed an incredulity amongst the
participants that complex technologies such as nuclear or CCS
could possibly work out cheaper than wind or solar energy.
“Well, wind is there and we're not going to run out of it.
Nuclear power depends on a limited uranium stocks, it's very
expensive to produce nuclear power stations, they produce
enormous amounts of waste that will remain dangerous for
thousands and thousands of years, and none of those things
can be said about wind power.” (Group 1)
“Wind and solar would be much more sensible and cheaper.
We need cleaner and cheaper ways to produce electricity”
(Group 3)
Interestingly, CCS was also described as ‘foreign’ and ‘unna-
tural’ while wind and solar were deemed ‘familiar’ and ‘natural’.
“… comparisons can be drawn between nuclear power and
Carbon Capture and Storage because of its technological basis,
it's kind of complicated, it's foreign to us. Wind, solar on the
other hand [are] both very simple … generally these are the
things we're familiar with because it's natural, so for those
reasons the wind power is something that most people would
be comfortable with.” (Group 1)
“Wind is natural, the wind turbine not so much. But … I don't
see it as being unnatural at all, it is just our technological way
of harnessing the natural and it's working.” (Group 1)
Other studies have found similar comparisons with other
technologies (solar, wind) with CCS being perceived as more
distant, risky and unfamiliar technology (Oltra et al., 2010). This
is a powerful opposition in which alternatives to CCS can be
variously considered ‘ours’, domestic, native, familiar and/or
authentic depending on how the word ‘foreign’ is read. This
contrast will be a difﬁcult one to shift as it emphasises features
that are intrinsic to the technologies and their deployment, rather
than unfortunate consequences.
4.5. Trust in government and the use of diversionary tactics
Some of our participants discussed CCS as something ‘being
done to us’. There was a distinct sense of feeling ‘out of the loop’,
or a loss of agency, in terms of having a say or input, from our
participants and of a decision to deploy CCS being taken elsewhere
without any input from them, as the discussion below exempliﬁes:
“F1—I say you think of all of this and before you know it it's
already been done.
F2—Yeah before you know it its already been done to you, you
know? And you can't do nothing, You're just eating all these
ﬁsh and you're going to the sea to bathe and suddenly you have
all these problems and allergies, that you don't even know
where they come from.
F1—And we haven't been given the opportunity to give an
opinion to say yes or no or whatever. To me personally I think
its something that we need to be informed properly how will it
work.” (Group 3)
Previous research has also emphasised the lack of trust that the
public hold in relation to government where technologies are
associated with environmental risks and uncertainties (Pidgeon
et al., 2003; Frewer, 1999; Wynne, 2006). The case of CCS is no
different. What the focus groups did reveal though is the sense that
the government were being under-hand and using diversionary
tactics. Participants (as outlined in Section 4.3) saw CCS as being
used to justify new coal power plants and cover for the continued
use of fossil fuels. A reliance on CCS was ‘an excuse’ and ‘an easy
way of escaping’. Not only was the government postponing change
—change that was seen as necessary and perhaps even inevitable—
but they were hiding a mistake (reliance on fossil fuels) that they
had already made. There was a sense that such diversionary tactics
would not work; the mistake could not be hidden forever and ‘it
will come up eventually one day’.
“It sounds to me that once they made the mistake and now
they are trying to hide it under the earth? It sounds to me like
that. Whatever the mistake they made with the energy and
building up their carbon dioxide and now they are trying to
hide it. And they're telling us that “no that's a nice thing it's a
very nice thing”…” (Group 3)
Finally it was clear that this lack of trust in government was
connected to the sense that the general public were powerless in
this policy context, which reinforces our earlier concerns (Lee
et al., 2013) that the limited scope for publics to inﬂuence
decisions in this area may further weaken trust. People felt that
‘its already been done to you… you can't do nothing’; there was no
option to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
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5. Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper, we have looked at the outputs of four focus
groups where members of the public, not directly involved in
energy policy or in a speciﬁc locally situated context, discussed
energy futures. From these discussions, we have identiﬁed a
number of factors that we believe shed light into how CCS is
evaluated and what people draw on to construct a response.
Firstly, we found that people's views on CCS are shaped and
framed by wider factors. While the technology raises speciﬁc
concerns and aspirations, these are rarely in isolation from a bigger
picture. Participants quickly started discussing trade-offs between
CCS and other renewable technologies and were concerned that CCS
might be developed at the expense of other renewable technologies.
As such, people's support or otherwise for CCS was strongly
dependent upon concerns about overall energy trajectories and
possible lock-in to one scenario over another. Our research suggest
that if the public are to be given the opportunity to engage on CCS
technology this should be part of a much wider conversation about
energy supply and demand as a whole. Recent work by UKERC has
provided further evidence which demonstrates the value of this
approach (Butler et al., 2013; Parkhill et al., 2013).
Secondly, we found that in considering CCS within this wider
‘energy futures’ context, many constructed a mental dichotomy that
splits technologies between ‘good’, ‘natural’ and commonsense tech-
nologies (exempliﬁed by wind turbines) and ‘bad’, ‘unnatural’ and
industrialised technologies (exempliﬁed by nuclear power). CCS was
put into the less positive ‘nuclear’ category within this dichotomy.
Previous research has shown that people respond to unfamiliar
things or technologies by drawing on existing ideas, notions, values
and experiences. The literature on CCS and other technologies such
as nanotechnology and GM has shown that people draw very
strongly on their previous experience of other technologies to
create historic analogies (Scheufele and Lewenstein, 2005; Currall
et al., 2006; Upham and Roberts, 2011). Here we found that nuclear
power was not simply a signpost to possible views, but was a
dominant frame drawn on to make sense of CCS technology and to
articulate their concerns and reservations. This frame did not
appear to be related to recent nuclear incidents and Fukashima,
for instance, was not mentioned.
Signiﬁcantly, the group made up of 16–18 year olds did not
seem to evoke the nuclear power frame. This suggests that such an
association is generational, possibly based on ﬁrst-hand memories
of events/public discourses relating to nuclear power. Given that
the UK has not had any new nuclear power developments, nor
high-proﬁle debate on the matter for three or more decades, the
young people would not have been exposed to public discourse or
events relating to nuclear power. Their associations with nuclear
were from popular culture (The Simpsons) and related to nuclear
weapons. This does however raise interesting questions about the
possible impact of current plans for new nuclear build in the UK.
Evenwithout exposure to nuclear debates, most of the participants
in our youth group expressed negative views toward nuclear
power. It is possible that the new developments will simply
provide harder evidence to justify these negative views.
There are clear technical parallels to be drawn between nuclear
power and CCS—for example, long term storage of a ‘waste
product’ or storage siting issues. Furthermore, Reiner and Nuttall
(2011) have speculated that the environmental movement’s his-
tory of opposition towards nuclear power may precipitate similar
protest towards CCS. They suggest, however, that this would be as
part of ‘a continuous tradition of countercultural protest’ (p. 307),
rather than being solely a result of people's speciﬁc engagement
with CCS and its technical parallels with nuclear. We suggest here
that nuclear power was operating as what the social psychology
literature would term an anchor or trope for interpreting CCS as a
technology (Farr, 1993; Wagner and Kronberger, 2001). Further,
the use of nuclear power as a framing device in our focus groups
appeared to be operating in a more historic, embedded and
symbolic manner than other instances where similar parallels
have been noted (Riesch et al., 2013).
Our ﬁndings also challenge current arguments from industry
and much of the acceptance research literature that the public
simply needs more information or education on CCS, before real or
substantial views can be formed (Ashworth et al., 2010; Science
Buisiness Symposium, 2012). As we have argued at the beginning
of the paper, there is no minimal knowledge requirement within a
democracy. If CCS is rolled out, this will be against a backdrop of
various levels of engagement and knowledge of the technology.
People will express views regardless of how expert or otherwise
they are in the technology. Our research however has shown that
despite very minimal levels of knowledge, members of the public
are able to form coherent views about CCS and to articulate
clear justiﬁcations for these views. The concerns and questions
expressed have strong resemblances to the key concerns and
questions being considered by ‘experts’ in CCS—concerns about
environmental impact of accidental leaks, risk of unintended
consequences, the untested nature of the technology and the long
term trajectory it sets us upon, for instance. These are substantial
and justiﬁable concerns rather than ﬁctional or imagined issues.
We found that there was little difference in the views of those
lay-participants who we found already knew a little about CCS
(environmental groups and local councillors) and those who had
known nothing in advance. Signiﬁcantly, the views expressed by
both these groups were more similar to each other and to those of
environmental groups objecting to CCS than to the views of the
CCS industry and the UK Government (Greenpeace International,
2008; Huijts et al., 2007; Hansson and Bryngelsson, 2009). This
presents a further challenge to those arguing that the gap between
public and expert views of CCS demonstrates the need for simply
more information. Instead of the public having unformed views
waiting to be made positive, we argue that our research demon-
strates that many members of the public have latently negative
views waiting to be expressed. Evidence from other technologies
(Gaskell et al., 1998; Martin et al., 1992) suggests that in other
similar situations, more information has merely acted to polarise
and reinforce existing views. The relationship between knowledge
and attitudes to new technologies is complex. Furthermore, with-
out a ‘need’ to obtain more information, for example by feeling
that one's say will feed into policy, there is little reason to believe
that information giving will have any effect. People will likely
draw strongly upon their values, predispositions and previous
experiences in forming views around CCS.
Last, this research raises a wider question of the involvement of
the public in discussions not simply about CCS, but about our
energy future. If the public, as is suggested here and elsewhere, do
not feel that they have any say in high-level decisions about
energy futures and are only consulted at a local level to manage
the impact of decisions already made for them with respect to one
technology, this starts any public participation process off on the
wrong foot. Furthermore, we would challenge proposals for a
communication approach that prioritises educating an ignorant
public on the speciﬁcs of one technology. Instead, our research
suggests that a broader conversation that acknowledges the wider
issues around energy use might precipitate more trust and
legitimate decisions—although not necessarily agreement.
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